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    South Asia
    India
    December 15, 2021 No Comments

    Carbon neutrality or net-zero carbon dioxide emissions entails balancing emissions of carbon dioxide with its removal or by eliminating emissions from society. While 2020 was a bleak year, owing to the Covid crisis, it ended with some hope for the planet when a group of developed countries – USA, Canada, Japan declared their resolve to achieve net zero emissions by 2050. China declared that it would be able to achieve the same by 2060. There is a growing pressure on India too to declare this as such but Indian Government has stated clearly that it cannot possibly do it alone, and without jettisoning the project of pulling millions living in poverty in the country.
    The declarations of the developed country is being seen as a timely declaration coming along with Special Report on 1.5 degree Celsius. There are several cities, municipalities, and businesses world over which are declaring net zero targets in 2050.These numbers are climbing quickly, particularly because the U.N. Secretary General asked countries to come forward with net-zero targets. The U.N. High Level Climate Champions’ Race to Zero campaign also calls on regions, cities, businesses, investors and civil society to submit plans to reach net-zero emissions by 2050 in advance of the United Nations climate negotiations (COP 26) in Glasgow in November 2021. The Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5˚C, from “the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), finds that if the world reaches net-zero emissions by 2040, the chance of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees C is considerably higher. All in all, the world must try to reach net zero targets as soon as may be. The chances of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees C, however, depend significantly on how soon the highest emitters reach net-zero emissions

    Differential Capacity to achieve the net zero target

    This does not, however, suggest that all countries need to or can reach net-zero emissions at the same time. WRI (2019) argues that “Equity-related considerations — including responsibility for past emissions, equality in per-capita emissions and capacity to act — suggest earlier dates for wealthier, higher-emitting countries. Policy, technology and behaviour need to shift across the board”. In pathways to 1.5 degrees C, renewables are projected to supply 70-85% of electricity by 2050, which is one of the most important mechanisms through which the goal can be achieved.
    India is in a dilemma. It cannot possibly commit to net zero by 2050 without abdicating its responsibility towards its citizens of providing affordable, clean energy, employment, proper infrastructure etc. India has done more than most countries with its level of development and its poverty profile and is trying very hard to reduce its GHG emissions as quickly as possible. This is reflective in India investing heavily in its renewable energy programme and has reiterated its 450 GW target of installled RE capacity by 2030. But is indecisive about announcing its net zero target by 2050. This is because net zero target would require a multi sector, multi-level action, something India sees unlikely to be able to do by 2050. Changes in patterns of energy production and consumption, industrial production and consumption, transport – would all require fundamental changes in which , and while India taking relevant steps, it’s not happening fast enough. India and other nations, through their INDCs has outlined its post-2020 climate actions to contribute toward the 2°C global warming limit. For most countries steps to reach net zero target through decarbonization cover greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets in energy, industry, agriculture, waste, land use and forestry, and transport—the sectoral focus varying from country to country. These have been laid down in their respective INDCS.

    South Asia and Net Zero

    Mitigation targets in the INDCs of various countries are reflective of their efforts and alignment with the 1.5 to 2 degree Celsius target. Where is South Asia at the moment in terms of alignment of its mitigation efforts (expressed in INDCs) to the 1.5 – 2 degree temperature limit? Except for Bhutan and Nepal, South Asian countries provided intended mitigation contribution in terms of percentage reduction in GHG emissions or emission intensity. Bangladesh, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka aim at GHG emission/ carbon intensity reduction ranging from 5% to 24% by 2030, from BAU, with components conditional on international assistance. India commits to reduce emission intensity by 33% to 35% by 2030 compared with 2005. While not providing a specific GHG emission reduction commitment, Bhutan stated intention to remain carbon neutral where GHG emissions will not exceed carbon sequestration by the forests. On the other hand, Nepal’s stated commitments were in terms of reduction in fossil fuel dependency, appropriate mix of renewable energy in energy mix, and maintained forest cover.

    We will look at these for all South Asian countries in some detail through perusal of their INDCs to first enumerate their mitigation targets and then assess their alignment with the 1.5to 2 degree Celsius target. These INDCS are either based on conditional or unconditional international support. Afghanistan in its INDC has committed to 13.6% reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 compared with Business-as-Usual (BAU), conditional on external support. These would require financial assistance from the developed countries for its achievement. Bhutan on the other hand seeks to remain carbon neutral where GHG emissions will not exceed carbon sequestration by forests (approximately 6 million tons of CO2).

    India has both conditional and unconditional targets, which include  – Reduce emission intensity of its gross domestic product (GDP) by 33%–35% by 2030 compared with 2005 (no bind on any sector-specific mitigation obligation/action) • Achieve 40% cumulative electric power installed capacity from non – fossil fuel-based energy resources by 2030 (with transfer of technology and low-cost international finance) • Create an additional carbon sink of 2.5–3 billion tons of CO2 equivalent through additional forest and tree cover by 2030.  Nepal’s conditional INDCs include – • Achieve 80% electrification through renewable energy sources having appropriate energy mix by 2050. • Reduce dependency on fossil fuels by 50% by 2050 • Maintain 40% of total area of country forest cover • Sustainable Forest management to increase forest productivity and products. 

    Srilanka’s conditional and unconditioanal targets include – Reduce GHG emissions by 20% (approximately 36,010.2 gigagram [Gg]) in energy sector by 2030 against the BAU scenario – 4% unconditionally (approximately 7,202.04 Gg) and 16% conditionally (approximately28,808.16 Gg). • Reduce GHG emissions by 10% from transport, waste, industries, and forest – 3% unconditionally and 7% conditionally against BAU scenarios

    Pakistan’s conditional target is reduce emissions after reaching peak levels (subject to affordability, provision of international climate finance, transfer of technology and capacity building). The conditional and unconditional target of Bangladesh include : Reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 5% (12 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent [MtCO2e]) from BAU levels by 2030 in the power, transport, and industry sectors, based on existing resources • Reduce GHG emissions by 15% (36 MtCO2e) from BAU levels (by 2030 in the power, transport, and industry sectors (subject to appropriate international support on finance, investment, technology development and transfer, and capacity building). 

    Net Zero for South Asia is a long route

    These are the mitigation targets submitted as a part of the INDCs by the South Asian countries to the UNFCCC as a vision they seek and would achieve given financial and technological support they get. These are plans that the countries seek to pursue to contribute to the prevention of climate change. But most of these are not 1.5 – 2 degree Celsius aligned. Its only Nepal, Bhutan and India whose INDCs if pursued rigorously is 2-degree Celsius compatible. The rest are either not or have not submitted sufficient information to be able to infer combability.

    The Climate Action Tracker (CAT) has assessed the fair sharing of the proposed contributions of selected countries on efforts to move global emissions downward through 2030. It provided ratings on intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs), pledges, and current policies, specifically on whether they are consistent with a country’s fair share effort to holding warming to below 2°C.The assessment included six developing member countries of ADB: Bhutan, India, the People’s Republic of China, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, and Nepal.
    Bhutan’s pledge was rated “sufficient” for 2025, and it is the only country ever rated “Role Model.” This rating is based on emissions excluding land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) and takes into consideration that, as a developing country with currently very low emissions per capita, Bhutan’s emissions are expected to grow over this time period. Gradual reductions will be needed afterward.
    India’s pledges were rated “medium.” The pledges are in line with effort sharing approaches that focus on equal cumulative per capita emissions. A “medium” rating indicates that commitments are not consistent with limiting warming below 2°C and greater effort or deeper reductions from other countries are required. Approaches that focus on historical responsibility and capability would require more stringent emission reductions. The “medium” rating indicates that India’s climate commitments are at the least ambitious end of what would be a fair contribution. This means it is not consistent with limiting warming to below 2°C unless other countries make much deeper reductions and comparably greater effort.
    Nepal has not made any emissions reduction pledge, hence no rating was provided. Its own emissions make up less than 0.1% of global emissions. With its current policies, Nepal’s greenhouse gas emissions are expected to increase by 62% by 2030 compared with 2010 levels. Nepal’s projected emission levels in 2020, 2025, and 2030 are in the “sufficient” range. CAT analysis determined an upper end of the “medium” range for Nepal using effort-sharing approaches based on quality principles. To be in line with approaches that focus on responsibility and capability, Nepal would need to reduce its emissions from its current policy projected levels. Apart from the three countries most have not been assessed.Source: Climate Action Tracke

    Potential for Decarbonisation through Renewable Power Generation in South Asia 

    A lack in the INDCs of the South Asian Countries is largely due to the fact that lack of finance and technology has prevented RE potential from being sufficiently exploited. We will now assess the progress and potential of the countries towards their mitigation targets, especially their RE targets. India has set an objective of 450 GW by 2030. India has tremendous potential for solar energy and is also expanding wind energy. By July 2020, India had reached a total RE installed capacity of 86 GW. 

    In 2019, Bangladesh had 2.1 percent and 1.2 percent of solar and hydro in the total installed capacity respectively. In Pakistan in 2019, of total installed capacity, 29.4 percent and 4.97 percent were constituted by hydro and solar respectively. According to WB Pakistan has tremendous potential to generate solar and wind power. According to the WB, utilizing just 0.071 percent of the country’s area for solar photovoltaic (solar PV) power generation would meet Pakistan’s current electricity demand. Wind is also an abundant resource. Pakistan has several well-known wind corridors. 

    As a developing country, Sri Lanka’s demand for electricity is going to increase in the future. It is imperative therefore, for Sri Lanka to secure its energy future by focusing on the development and adoption of indigenous, renewable sources of energy to meet this growing demand and reduce the economic burden of imports. Acknowledging this need, Sri Lanka saw an increase in the share of renewable energy (RE) in the electricity mix, when in 2014, the country met its target of generating at least 10 percent of its electricity using renewable energy. Subsequently, in 2015, the contribution of fossil fuels to the electricity mix decreased, at the same time as a rise in the contribution of both renewable energy and large hydro. In 2019 Srilanka, of the total installed capacity, 34 percent was constituted by wind and 3.6 percent by solar. 

    Maldives is Infact totally dependent upon fossil fuels and, in 2019 had only 4.9 percent of solar in the total installed capacity. Maldives is located in the Equator and receives abundant solar energy. Maldives Receives about 400 Million MW of Solar Energy Per Annum and tremendous potential for wind energy. Other forms of RE need to be exploited as well but lack of financing, technical capacity and infrastructure has so far prevented it from happening. Nepal and Bhutan almost completely rely on hydropower, and other forms of RE need to be explored. In 2019, Nepal of the total installed capacity, 70.7 and 24.9 percent were constituted by large and small hydro respectively. And Bhutan had 99.93 percent of hydro of the total capacity. Afghanistan as of now depends upon imported diesel but has tremendous solar potential, which can be exploited in future. In 2019, Afghanistan had established of the total installed capacity, 53.1 percent of hydro. More needs to be done to decarbonize power sector in South Asia by involving RE in the fuel mix. This however requires climate finance which is not available to these largely poor developing countries. (The information on installed capacity for various countries has been drawn from Energy Transition Platform hosted by the Vasudha Foundation). 

    Can SAARC provide the answer?

    There is tremendous potential for regional cooperation among SAARC countries to promote the promote the process of decarbonization in the various countries. There is also an argument that India will not be able to achieve this target without energy trade with the surrounding countries. CPR argues “Beyond the well documented roadblocks to such a radical systemic change, a politically thorny aspect has been overlooked – one that could make or break India’s efforts towards a just energy transition. According to Aditya Valiathan-Pillai from the CPR: “People have long talked about expanded grids as a way of adding large amounts of renewable energy to your energy mix. And that’s simply because renewables are intermittent. The idea of having a pan-continental grid, or a multi-country grid at the very least, has existed for a very long time, and has only been amplified and gained traction with the rise of modern renewable technologies. It has a lot of political salience in the sense that it creates interdependencies between countries and is seen as a way of actually preventing conflict. The reason why this idea doesn’t always take the top spot in the debate is because of the huge political costs involved in creating something like this”. A long term net zero target for South Asia , will require installation of expensive balancing technologies [to solve the intermittency problem], such as large batteries, or pumped hydro storage. Those things are hard to build and are expensive. Through grid expansion further out to countries like Nepal and Bhutan, who naturally have a lot of hydropower, or say Bangladesh, which seems to be investing in natural gas, also a good balancing technology. But there are challenges that prevent this from becoming a reality – geopolitical dynamics between countries, their failure to find support in home constituencies, their inability to follow through their own commitment made at multilateral forums such as SAARC are to name a few. Even if these challenges are addressed, India is looking at a 2060 – 70 timeline, and that too if geopolitics aligns itself well. 

    References

    1. ADB, 2016. Assessing the Intended nationally Determined Contributions of Developing Members. 
    2. WRI, 2019, What does net zero mean and 8 most common asked questions, answered
    3. The Wire, 2015, Why cant India meet its net zero targets alone?
    Afghanistan
    Afghanistan
    December 1, 2021 No Comments

    ONAI – Climate Change Studies Organisation for Afghanistan

    INDEX;

    Introduction

    The current fragile political situation in Afghanistan has not only humanitarian and economic consequences for the country itself, but it could result in a spread of insecurity and destabilization of the region between Central and South Asia, with disruption of regional economic cooperation efforts between the regional countries that have started in the recent years. In particular, the regional energy projects experienced unprecedented progress during the last two decades. Projects such as CASA-1000, the TAPI gas pipeline, TAP, and TUTAP were promising endeavors to facilitate cooperation among the regional countries of Central and South Asia and extend this cooperation to other sectors, such as trade and transport.Due to its geographical location, Afghanistan is considered the main linkage to the two strategic regions- Central and South Asia. However, the recent regime change resulting in a takeover by the Taliban has caused uncertainties regarding the implementation of the ongoing and planned regional projects.

    This blog will assess the implication of potential long-term isolation of Afghanistan due to the recent taking over by the Taliban on the ongoing and future regional energy cooperation between Central and South Asia.

    Background

    According to the World Bank (2017), South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world, where the total share of intra-regional trade is five percent of the total regional trade. Compared to South Asia, the ASEAN regional trade accounts for 25 percent of total trade (ibid).

    Figure 1: Intra-regional trade in South Asia (World Bank, 2017)

    Despite the fact that the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established in 1985 to enhance regional cooperation in South Asia, the organization is labeled by many experts as a study driven institution that has not realized that “real cooperation does not rest in intention but implementation” (Sridharan, 2007). Even the SAARC Energy Centre (SEC) establishment in 2006 could not move towards the creation of the intended regional energy market.

    Scholars believe that the existing disagreement in SAARC is rooted on a bilateral level (ibid), with the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan at the center. Moreover, the multi-faceted conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan and other South Asian countries has caused the current stagnation within SAARC. In addition to the political issues on a regional level, the countries of South Asia also suffered from country-specific matters on a policy and implementation level that impeded effective steps towards regional cooperation (World Bank, 2008; Singh et al.,2015).

    Under consideration of the political circumstances in South Asia, there were two options- continuation of the status quo or searching for new ways of cooperation that will result in economic growth and prosperity through cooperation in key areas, such as the energy sector. To overcome this stagnation, an extension of the cooperation efforts to Central Asia was proposed, focusing on projects in the energy sector. In that regard, the ESMAP[1]  report from 2008 published by the World Bank can be viewed as one of the key documents of the extended regional energy cooperation between Central and South Asia, with Afghanistan as the main transit route (World Bank, 2008).

    The vision of the creation of Central Asia South Asia Electricity Market (CASAREM) started with the initiation and planning of the CASA 1000 project, which aims to transmit power from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan with a total capacity of 1,3000 MW. The project is currently under implementation, and the scheduled completion is 2024. Another critical project is the Turkmenistan- Afghanistan- Pakistan (TAP) 500 kV interconnection that shall provide up to 4,000 MW of electricity to Afghanistan and Pakistan (Ministry of Finance, 2016). In addition, the TUTAP (Tajikistan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan- Afghanistan-Pakistan Interconnection) concept envisages the supply of surplus electricity[2]  from Central Asia to Pakistan (Asian Development Bank, 2014).

    Figure 2: Central Asia- South Asia Power Projects (CAREC, 20

    The 1,600 km TAPI gas pipeline, which is the first interregional project involving India, shall provide 33 billion cubic meters (BCM) of natural gas from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (European Union, 2016). The implementation of Phase 1[3]  of TAPI (Asian Development Bank, 2020), supported by ADB, has started in Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan has inaugurated the start of works on Afghanistan soil in February 2018 (Pannier, 2018).

    Figure 3: The TAPI Gas Pipeline (European Union, 2016)

    The ongoing interregional projects are at a different stage of implementation and the regional countries, despite existing financial, economic, and also security-related impediments, view this interdependency approach as a win-win situation for all involved countries. They shall not only facilitate energy security and economic development but also pave the way for political stability and peacebuilding in the broader region.

    However, the situation has changed with the collapse of the government in Afghanistan and taking over by the Taliban, who now have control over the Afghan territory. Although the Taliban have announced a caretaker government, no country has recognized their administration up to now. Despite the fact that the international community has requested the Taliban to consider the inclusivity aspect in their government, which comprises the consideration of all ethnic groups of the country and the inclusion of Afghan women in all levels of governance, up to now, the Taliban have not shown real intentions to accept the conditions of the international community.
    The ongoing situation has a massive impact on the humanitarian situation of millions of Afghans, particularly women and children, but could also have a considerable impact on the political and economic situation of the broader region between South and Central Asia. The aforementioned regional energy projects also face an uncertain future in the light of recent developments in Afghanistan, which could have implications on the envisaged regional cooperation efforts between Central and South Asia if Afghanistan is politically and economically isolated.

    In the following, the possible implication of Afghanistan’s isolation for regional energy cooperation is discussed.

     

    Impact of Afghanistan’s possible long-term isolation on inter-regional energy trade between South and Central Asia

    The taking over of Kabul on 15 August by the Taliban has changed the dynamics in the region between Central and South Asia entirely. Major financial institutions such as the World Bank[4] , the International Monetary Fund (IMF)[5] , and the Asian Development Bank have halted their operations in Afghanistan. As a consequence, all ongoing and planned development projects have been stopped since 15 August 2021.

    The support to Afghanistan is limited to humanitarian assistance through the United Nations in order to prevent a humanitarian disaster during the upcoming winter. The current humanitarian crisis is exacerbated by a devastating drought throughout almost all country provinces, whereas over 14 million people suffer from food insecurity (World Food Programme, 2021).

    No country within the international community has recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, and the United States has frozen all the country’s financial assets (Latifi, 2021). Possible recognition of the Taliban government is based on conditions, including forming an inclusive government, respecting human and women’s rights, and counterterrorism assurances (Watkins et al., 2021). International recognition is of the few remaining levers the United States and other countries can utilize to pressure the Taliban government (ibid). The frozen assets of over USD 9.5 billion (Latifi, 2021), although having enormous consequences for millions of Afghans, is another pressure tool of the international community to bring the Taliban on a path that conforms to international norms of the 21st century.

    Even countries such as Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Iran, and China, who had very close exchanges with the Taliban over the years, have not recognized the Taliban regime. The mentioned countries have not closed their diplomatic representation in Kabul, but as expressed by the Russian foreign minister Lavrov the international recognition “is at the present juncture not on the table” (Nichols, Psaledakis, 2021). India, an important stakeholder in the region, fears that the Taliban will allow the influx of fighters through Pakistan into Kashmir (NRP, 2021) and has indicated huge concerns about Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Therefore, diplomatic relations between New Delhi and the Taliban regime depend not only on the decision of international stakeholders but also on the regional dynamics between Pakistan and India and the developments in Kashmir.

    The Central Asian countries have taken different paths in regards to relations and possible recognition of the Taliban. Whereas Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan have either met with the Taliban or even sent their envoys to Kabul, Tajikistan’s President has expressed his concern and openly criticized the lack of Tajik representative in the Taliban government.

    The foreign minister of Uzbekistan visited Kabul last week with the aim, among others, to secure the planned bilateral projects, such as the Surkhan-Pole Khumri 500 kV transmission line and the railway projects from Mazar-e Sharif in Afghanistan to Peshawar that will open South Asian ports for Uzbek good (Eurasianet, 2021a). Turkmenistan has similar economic interests and has even met the Taliban beginning of this year and then shortly after the taking over of Kabul, discussing the implementation of TAPI and other projects (Eurasianet, 2021b) which indicates a very pragmatic approach on both sides focusing on economic gains.

    Kyrgyzstan expressed in a statement from the President’s office its concerns over “the formation of a theocratic state “(Pannier, 2021); however, it also sent a delegation in September to Kabul who met the acting minister of the Taliban.

    In contrast, Tajikistan that shares a long border with Afghanistan, is one of the main electricity exporters[6]  to the country and a primary stakeholder in the CASA-1000 project, expressed its deep concerns over the Taliban and the Tajik President accused them of human rights abuses against the Tajik minority in the Panjsher valley (AlJazeera, 2021)[7] . The Taliban, in response, accused Tajikistan of interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs and dismissed the claims of the President (ibid). The relation between the neighbors remains charged with tensions, and if continued, it can be a real impediment to political and economic cooperation between the neighbors.

    A recognition of the Taliban by the United States and their allies seem equal to the loss of another of the few remaining leverages over them and could increase the probability of continuing the Taliban’s repressive and exclusive governance form. This decision would open up the international stage for the Taliban without any tangible concessions regarding human and women rights and the formation of an inclusive government, which will worsen the situation of the people, particularly that of women and girls.

    On the other side, continuing the current situation may result in a complete collapse of the Afghan economy. Without a recognized government in place, major international financial institutions and donor agencies involved in the regional projects will not be able to restart their activities and finance the projects where Afghanistan is a key transit route. This situation will not only impact Afghanistan but will also have an enormous impact on the economies of Central Asian countries, which are very much dependent on revenues from current and future regional energy projects. Moreover, this state will close the envisaged inter-regional cooperation between South and Central Asia for years, if not decades.

    Furthermore, complete isolation of Afghanistan could also facilitate opening new sanctuaries for various militant groups who have agendas beyond the Afghan border. Considering the recent attacks of the ISIS-K in Kabul and other provinces, the threat is real and requires joint efforts from neighboring countries, regional powers, the US, and Europe.

    However, the question remains on how to engage with the Taliban in this regard.

     

    Conclusion & Recommendations

    Taliban need international recognition to avoid political isolation as they experienced from 1996-2001 and prevent a complete collapse of the economy which will definitely cause internal challenges to their anyhow fragile governance which lacks support by the people.

    The international community has announced certain conditions before assessing the recognition of the Taliban government in Kabul, where the formation of an inclusive government representing all sections of the Afghan society, the respect of human and women rights, freedom of speech and freedom of expression, the access of girls and women to education and maintaining of a vibrant civil society and a free media, build the fundamental pillars and that shall be uncompromisable. However, to ensure the implementation of the conditional recognition, it is necessary that a monitoring mechanism supervised by an independent international body led by the UN is place. A violation of the commitments made by the Taliban shall imply that the reconsideration and possibly deprivation of the recognition and freezing of the financial and development aid support to the Taliban.

    Because Afghanistan will continue to depend on international aid for the following years, development aid is another substantial leverage for the international community to push through its demands.

    Based on the mechanism above, which includes an independent and regular oversight of the commitments made by the Taliban, the international community could assess a conditional recognition, the recommencement of financial support, and the restart of national projects financed by international financing institutions and donor agencies.

    Regarding regional projects, the international community may choose a different approach under consideration of the regional nature and the involvement of various parties. These projects have economic weight for the involved regional countries and are also of enormous political importance as the created interdependency can improve peace and security in the broader region.

    A withdrawal from the regional projects may cause pressure on the Taliban in the short term, but in the long term, such a decision could negatively affect the economic and political climate of the region between Central and South Asia. The ongoing and future projects, in particular in the energy sector, have gone through years of planning and negotiation processes, and the international community and also the involved countries have spent millions of USD on the endeavors; therefore, it is not advantageous to withdraw from these projects at such as critical juncture just because of disagreements with a single party.

    In contrast, these projects can be utilized as an additional pressure tool on the Taliban since they also signaled their support to these projects and, therefore, are willing to cooperate rather than seeing them in an isolated position.

    Besides the major international donor, the regional countries could also conduct, in a coordinated manner, bilateral and multilateral talks with the Taliban. For the involved regional countries with substantial economic benefits from the energy trade, these projects are part of their long-term economic strategy for developing and opening new markets for their goods and services. Thus, they will seek ways for continuation of the projects and will coordinate their efforts with the international stakeholders to secure the political and financial support of international organizations.

    In terms of financial management of the expected assets generated from the regional projects for Afghanistan, a special purpose fund could be established, and the money can be channeled through an independent body monitored by the UN. This independent body can then invest these funds through an off-budget mechanism on development projects from which the Afghan people can directly benefit and where the Taliban administration is not in direct control of the funds and its expenditure. This approach can change later, and the funds can be diverted to the Afghan financial institutions if the Taliban have fulfilled the conditions of the international community and proven themselves as an accountable and reliable administration.

    It can be concluded that the ongoing inter-regional energy projects are of importance for political stability and economic development of the region between Central and South Asia and, therefore, a continuation of the projects is critical to achieve the expected long-term political and economic goals in the region. The management and oversight mechanism in regards to Afghanistan can help to have control over the Taliban and shall be led by the United Nations. This approach will ensure that the projects can be continued, the people of Afghanistan are not isolated and the Taliban are under regular monitoring by the international community measuring their actions towards the Afghan people, the region and the international community.

    [1] Potential and Prospects of Regional Energy Trade in the South Asia Region (ESMP) published by the World Bank in 2008

    [2] CASA-1000 HDVC line provides power only during five months of the year; therefore, the line can be used for the remaining months of the year for surplus supply from Central Asia to Pakistan

    [3] AFG and PKA sections of the TAPI pipeline, with a capacity of 11 billion BCM/annum

    [4] https://www.bbc.com/news/business-58325545

    [5] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/imf-suspends-afghanistans-access-fund-resources-over-lack-clarity-government-2021-08-18/

    [6] Imports account for over 75 percent of Afghanistan’s currently available electricity, whereas Tajikistan, with 24 % (144 MW), is the second-largest supplier after Uzbekistan (Source: DABS, 2021)

    [7] https://www.aljazeera.com/program/inside-story/2021/10/2/how-will-the-taliban-handle-its-dispute-with-tajikistan

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    World Bank (2008) Potential and Prospects for Regional Energy Trade in the South Asia Region. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/380071468306294151/pdf/462820ESM0bBox1egional1energy1trade.pdf (Accessed: 10 April 2017).

    World Bank (2017) One South Asia. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/south-asia-regional-integration (23 August 2017).

    World Food Programme (2021) Data Afghanistan. Available at: https://www.wfp.org/countries/afghanistan (Accessed: 10 October 2021)

    Regional cooperation
    Maldives
    November 28, 2021 No Comments

    Regional cooperation is imperative for recovery from the intersectional harm caused by the climate crisis and Covid-19, particularly following the outcome of the climate change negotiations in Glasgow. Although some progress was made during COP26, current commitments – if upheld – will only limit warming to 2.4 degrees Celsius, instead of 1.5 degrees, which imperrels the Maldives existence[1]. For small island nations, such as the Maldives, regional cooperation is vital for the nation to not only survive climate change impacts and the ongoing pandemic, but for its citizens to thrive.

    The Maldives is on the climate crisis frontline as 80 percent of‌ ‌islands‌ are ‌less‌ ‌than‌ ‌1‌ ‌meter‌ ‌(3‌ ‌feet)‌ ‌above‌ ‌sea‌ ‌level‌ ‌and‌ ‌consist‌ ‌of‌ ‌porous‌ ‌coral. There are myriad climate change impacts besieging the nation including: sea level rise, coastal erosion, water and soil salinization, extreme weather and flooding, coral bleaching, etc. Over 90 percent of islands are experiencing annual flooding, while erosion is impacting 97 percent of islands (with 64 percent of islands experiencing severe erosion)[2]. These impacts are putting communities at great risk as 50 percent of all housing structures are located 100 meters from the coastline[3].

    While climate change impacts have been exacerbating existing socio-economic and environmental vulnerabilities, the Maldives has been striving toward sustainable development, in conjunction with climate adaptation and resilience measures. The Covid-19 pandemic has thwarted these efforts by ravaging the nation – in deaths, infections and overtaxing limited healthcare resources – and by eliminating the economic means to address both the pandemic and climate change. “Both the World Bank and Asian Development Bank assess Maldives as being one of the worst hit in the world from the pandemic[4].” Just as with climate change impacts, Covid-19 has exposed existing inequalities and critical needs, particularly for vulnerable groups and individuals. Although there has been some progress toward recovery, as tourism – which the Maldivian economy is highly dependent on – slowly picks up and Covid-19 vaccination rates increase, the situation is far from stabilized[5].

    Climate change impacts will continue to affect the Maldives, as the country is projected to be underwater due to sea level rise in 50 years unless drastic action is taken immediately[6]. Even if warming is limited to 1.5 degrees, climate change impacts – such as sea level rise – will continue for hundreds to thousands of years[7]. Meanwhile, the effects of Covid-19 are ongoing worldwide, leaving the Maldives precariously vulnerable to related shocks. To that end, the Maldivian government is seeking to “build back better” to recover from these persistent crises by accelerating its sustainable development trajectory.

    “With a focus on building back better, this is an opportunity to change the course of the country, invest in Maldives’s natural wealth and work towards a different future for the country. A more resilient Maldives, less vulnerable, less dependent, and building on its vast and diverse blue green economy with a core focus on sustainable and inclusive development marked by progress in achieving the SDGs [sustainable development goals][8].”

    While national efforts to achieve Maldives’ SDGs, climate mitigation, adaptation and resilience, as well as manage the pandemic are laudable, additional support is vital. Addressing the interrelated impacts caused by climate change and the pandemic requires regional cooperation within South Asia. This is imperative to potentially coordinate knowledge and resource sharing, as well as strengthen the negotiating position of vulnerable groups and nations within South Asia[9]. Nations within the region are incredibly vulnerable to climate change impacts, which often have transnational effects[10], as does the pandemic. There are numerous regional international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as other civil society groups operating in South Asia – such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP),  and the Climate Action Network (CAN) – that aim to coordinate in the face of these threats, in which the Maldives participates. Continuing to strengthen the relationships and initiatives within the regional institutions and organizations of South Asia is essential, especially as wealthier nations continue to drive the climate crisis, fall woefully short on their commitments to provide climate finance for adaptation, and limit vaccine availability.

    [1] https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/11/1105792
    https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2021/11/15/what-did-cop26-achieve/

    [2] https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2021/09/maldives-climate-change-aminath-shauna-trenches.htm

    [3] https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2021/09/maldives-climate-change-aminath-shauna-trenches.htm

    [4] https://maldives.un.org/en/102364-addressing-socio-economic-impact-covid-19-maldives

    [5] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/10/06/aldives-recovery-prospects-improve-amidst-uncertainties

    [6] https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/

    [7] https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2021/08/IPCC_WGI-AR6-Press-Release_en.pdf

    [8] https://maldives.un.org/en/102364-addressing-socio-economic-impact-covid-19-maldives

    [9] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281175327_Climate_Change_Adaptation_in_the_
    Framework_of_Regional_Cooperation_in_South_Asia

    [10] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283436395_Climate_risks_in_the_SAARC_region_ways_to_
    address_the_social_economic_environmental_challenges

    The Afghan Power Sector
    Afghanistan
    November 15, 2021 No Comments

    Introduction

    With the state collapse on 15th August and the subsequent taking over by the Taliban, Afghanistan once again looks into an uncertain future. The recent developments led to the breakdown of the civilian state institutions and the entire security sector and had devastating consequences for the country’s economy. The banking system is near to collapse,  the inflation is soaring, and , people are desperate as most of them have lost their jobs and are short of cash. 

    This month, the UNDP announced that if the current political and economic crisis is not addressed; as much as 97 percent of the population will sink below the poverty line until mid-2022. In addition, Afghanistan is suffering from severe drought, with over half of the country is in an acute food security crisis.[1] (FEWS, 2021), which will worsen during the upcoming winter. 

    The international community has pledged over USD 1 billion as humanitarian assistance to the country in order to avoid a humanitarian disaster. However, the implementation process is still on a slow path and has to be expedited to bring the urgently needed aid to the beneficiaries. 

    The state-owned power utility Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS) still provides electricity to its customers. However, due to a lack of revenues and the daily increase of due payments, the utility will soon not be able to pay the due payments to the foreign and domestic power providers and will not be able to cover its operational costs. Thus, the risk of a complete collapse of the utility within the next weeks is imminent.  

    Therefore, it is essential to consider preventive measures that include the continuation of DABS’ operations and alternative options in case of a decrease of the available on-grid power. 

    The following blog starts by providing a background of the power sector of Afghanistan, then illustrates the current situation of the power sector, and concludes with a proposed emergency plan to rescue the power sector from collapse. 

    Background

    Afghanistan is a country that possesses vast resources for electricity generation from renewable sources such as hydro, solar, and wind. The country’s hydro generation potential is estimated at 23,000 MW, whereas the wind potential is 67,000 MW (Ministry of Energy and Water, 2015). With 300 sunny days per year (Ghalib, 2017), Afghanistan has excellent potential to generate a significant part of its electricity demand from solar energy. 

    Despite the vast potential for domestic power generation, the country is importing more than 75 percent of its power from Central Asia and Iran (DABS, 2020). Around 20 percent is generated on Afghan soil, with hydropower as the premier source of generation. 

    In terms of institutional arrangements, the Afghan power sector was led by the Ministry of Energy and Water.[2]  responsible for all activities on a policy level, whereas DABS was the state-owned power utility responsible for the supply of electricity to consumers and the operation and maintenance of generation, transmission, and distribution in the county. Despite the efforts of the international community and Afghan stakeholders, the third pillar that shall have been responsible for regulation purposes was never in place. The recent changes ordered by the former government led by Ashraf Ghani that dissolved the Ministry of Energy and Water and replaced this institution with two independent authorities was a step leading to further complications of the situation without tangible results in regards to clarity on roles & responsibilities and increase of accountability and transparency. 

      Figure 1: Afghanistan Grid System & Power Imports (Gencer et al., 2018)

    Worth noting that with the collapse of the Ghani-led government and taking over of the country by Taliban, the two independent authorities- NAWARA and ESRA- have been replaced by the Ministry of Energy and Water. 

    Despite the progress made during the last two decades where the connection rate was increased from less than 5 percent to over 30 percent, the power sector of Afghanistan continued to suffer from challenges in this area . The main issue, besides the lack of robust and accountable institutions and operational inefficiencies (e.g., up to 45 percent losses[3] ) was the huge dependency of the country on imported electricity from neighboring countries, mainly Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. According to DABS, still over 75 percent[4]  of the electricity is still imported from neighboring countries, which costs Afghanistan over USD 280 million annually (Jahanmal, 2020). 

    Figure 2: Power Sector- Import/Domestic Ratio & Connection Rate (dated: 2018)

    The reasons behind the decision for power imports rather than developing the vast domestic resources of the country go beyond the scope of this brief concept note and, therefore, will not be discussed further. However, one can clearly state that the lack of sufficient domestically generated electricity and the country’s huge dependency on imports was a main impediment to Afghanistan’s economic self-reliance. 

    The current situation, in particular in the light of the recent development in the country, has worsened the conditions of the power sector of Afghanistan.

    Current situation of the power sector in Afghanistan

    According to reliable sources from within DABS, the utility is on the verge of complete collapse if the international community does not provide the required financial means to maintain a basic level of operation of the utility. Current figures indicate that DABS’ due payments are at USD 85 million[5]  whereas the total revenue collection as of 27th September is only USD 49 million- a deficit of USD 36 million. Considering the fact that DABS will not be able to collect any additional revenues in the upcoming months but still has to continue the supply of power, the number of the due payments will further increase.

    If DABS cannot pay the power suppliers, the involved countries and the Independent Power Producers (IPPs) will most probably stop the supply of power to DABS and, depending on the contractual conditions, claim even additional compensations and penalties from the utility.

    This situation would mean that the power utility has to stop operations due to a lack of financial means to purchase power, pay its personnel and cover its O&M costs. Moreover, the domestic generation of power provided by hydropower will also decrease during the winter months. Emergency operations through diesel generators and utilization of existing thermal power plants will be too costly and, considering the current financial situation of DABS, not a feasible option.

    Consequently, not only will the Afghan people remain without light, but critical public services, such as the health and water supply sectors, will not be able to continue operations. If this situation occurs, it will not further deteriorate the catastrophic humanitarian situation but may also lead to an uncontrollable political destabilization of the country. 

    To avoid the mentioned collapse of the power sector of Afghanistan, urgent support is required. The focus shall be here on the continuation of power supply to critical public services, such as health and water supply, and the provision of financial support to DABS to pay its bills, personnel and maintain the existing power generation facilities and transmission & distribution networks.

    Alternative options during the current emergency situation

    Considering the criticality of the situation, it is of utmost importance to assess the acute crisis and provide a viable solution to avoid a complete collapse of the power sector.

    To achieve this, it is crucial to prioritize the supply of public facilities, such as hospitals and water supply utilities, to ensure the delivery of these services to the people. This means that DABS has to adjust its operation and focus on providing electricity to critical public infrastructure.

    For this, the utility shall also provide a realistic emergency plan that contemplates the emergency operation’s technical and financial/ commercial aspects.

    Within the approach mentioned above, the supply of power to private customers shall not be neglected, and alternative supply options must be contemplated. A viable option during the emergency phase could be installing off-grid solar rooftop systems and supplying DC- solar home kits to the people. Whereas installing solar rooftop systems (0.1-1 kW) could be a viable solution for cities such as Kabul, the DC solar home kits could cover semi-urban and rural areas of the country.

    Through this two-fold approach, DABS will continue to provide electricity to critical public services institutions , and satisfy its private customers’ electricity needs by providing off-grid solutions. The advantage of the off-grid solutions is that the current burden on DABS will be reduced, and the beneficiaries are also released from paying bills to the utility, which they anyhow cannot afford at the moment.

    However, considering the current situation of the banking sector and the financial liabilities of DABS, the plan mentioned above is not implementable without the support of the international community. The international community does not recognize the current administration of the Taliban and, therefore, formal communication on a bilateral and multilateral level between the Taliban and the international community, including international financing institutions and bilateral donor agencies, is not possible at this stage.

    Thus, the only viable option remains the pro-active engagement of the United Nations in the process. The United Nations shall commence its direct communication with DABS’ leadership and ask them to provide an emergency plan that considers the aforementioned aspects. Moreover, the United Nations could take the lead to discuss the current financial constraints of Afghanistan with the Central Asian countries and Iran and also the few Independent Power Producers and provide the required guarantees on the due payments to ensure the continuation of the power supply to the DABS’ network.

    Furthermore, through its agencies such as UNDP, the UN could draft a distribution plan for the off-grid solutions and make the required arrangements to start the installation and distribution of the systems, respectively. The UNDP could seek cooperation with the World Bank-initiated program- Lighting Global- which has the experience and certified suppliers in Asia who could provide the tools.

    Conclusion

    The current situation of the power sector in Afghanistan is critical and requires the international community’s urgent attention. A possible collapse of the country’s power sector has enormous consequences for other public services and can also lead to the further deterioration of the volatile situation of the country.

    To avoid the disastrous effects of such a collapse, it is therefore of utmost importance to that United Nations take the lead and draft in collaboration with the technical staff of DABS a comprehensive emergency power supply program that ensures the continuation of power supply to critical sectors, such as water supply and health. Moreover, the plan shall foresee the provision of off-grid solutions to private consumers and the provision of required financial guarantees to power suppliers (imports and IPPs) to ensure the continuation of the electricity supply by DABS.

    [1] Famine Early Warning Systems Network- https://fews.net/central-asia/afghanistan

    [2] In 2020, the Ministry of dissolved and two new independent authorities were established- National Water Regulatory Authority (NAWARA) and Energy Services Regulatory Authority (ESRA)

    [3] Technical and commercial losses (Power Sector Masterplan, 2013, p. 3-14)

    [4] The figure varies between 75 and 80 percent; Considering the seasonal variations in terms of domestic capacity and demand (summer vs. winter), 80 percent is to be a realistic figure

    [5] Imports and Independent Power Producers (IPPs)

    Bibliography
    Ghalib, A. (2017) ‘Afghanistan’s Energy Sector Development Plans’ [Power Point Presentation]. Available at: https://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/portal/content/conn/UCM/uuid/dDocName:EK-236901;jsessionid=K-M8GZmdX0-bSKpv0O7NR8_CD-VSxKcz_UZZqpyDWSK6Oq9YaU-M!3487174 (Accessed: 20th September 2017).

    Gencer, D., Irving, J., Meier, P., Spencer, R. and Wnuk, C. (2018) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Energy Security Trade-Offs under High Uncertainty: Resolving Afghanistan’s Power Sector Development Dilemma. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/136801488956292409/Islamic-Republic-of-Afghanistan-energy-security-trade-offs-under-high-uncertainty-resolving-Afghanistans-power-sector-development-dilemma (Accessed: 29th September 2021).

    Jahanmal, Z. (2020)’ Afghanistan Annually Pays $280 million for Imported Power, Tolonews, 30th August, Available at: https://tolonews.com/business/afghanistan-annually-pays-280m-imported-power (Accessed: 30th September 2021).

    Ministry of Energy and Water (2015) Renewable Energy Policy. Available at: http://www.red-mew.gov.af/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Afghanistan-Renewable-Energy-Policy-English-and-Dari.pdf (11th June 2017).

    Sri Lanka’s updated NDC
    Sri Lanka
    November 1, 2021 No Comments

    Sri Lanka has officially submitted the updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Sri Lanka has updated the initially submitted NDCs under the Paris Agreement in 2016 with higher ambition level.

    NDC is the building block of Paris Agreement, which was agreed in 2015 at the 21st Conference of Parties (COP21) of UNFCCC. The Paris Agreement brought a new global climate change regime as it builds on a bottom-up approach allowing the countries to determine the priority climate actions nationally considering the national capabilities and capacities. Accordingly, the parties will progressively update the NDCs once in five years in a transformative pathway towards resilient and net-zero status by 2050.

    The bottom-up and nationally driven approach is also expected to facilitate mainstreaming and integrating climate change priorities into development. Prior to the Paris Agreement, the parties were invited to submit their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) under the “Lima call for Climate Action” agreed at the COP20 of UNFCCC in 2014. It allows parties technically a less than a year to submit the INDCs with very little clarity and guidance of it. Sri Lanka, like many other countries, have submitted the INDCs and subsequent first NDC submission in a hurry. It hindered the potential integration and mainstreaming features of NDCs potentially affecting the level of ambition too.

    Sri Lanka submitted its first NDC in 2016 under four main areas viz: climate change mitigation, adaptation, loss &damage and means of implementation. It sets a target of reducing GHG emission by 4% unconditionally and 16% conditionally in the energy sector and by 3% unconditionally and 7% conditionally in transport, industry, forests, and waste sectors altogether, by 2030 against the business-as-usual (BAU) trajectories. Energy sector mitigation targets have been detailed out under the first NDC submission largely based on the then Long-term Generation and Expansion Plan (LTGEP) of the monopolistic utility of Sri Lanka, the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB). Those targets covered addition of renewable energy, demand side management and converting coal power plants to LNG. Transport, industries, waste management and forestry are the other sectors highlighted under the mitigation targets. Unlike the energy sector targets, these were more with qualitative targets and forestry sector showed only a coverage target of increasing the forest cover of the country from 29% to 32% by 2030 without a link to sequestration.

    The updated GHG reduction target by 2030 for energy sector has been increased to 25% (5% unconditional and 20% conditional) from its previous target of 20% (4% unconditional and 16% conditional), with increased focus on demand side management, transmission and distribution efficiencies, R & D on new renewables. For the transport sector target is set to reduce 4% of BAU (1% unconditional and 3% conditional), where the proposed strategies more or less remain the same as that of the initial submission.

    Updated NDCs has also introduced GHG reduction targets for industry sector; 7% of BAU (4% unconditional and 3% conditional), comparatively to other sectors, a promising target, mainly through fuel-switching, incentivising, setting up eco-industrial parks, and by employing circular economic principles etc. One of the most progressive GHG reduction targets appears in NDC-2020, is in waste sector. It is 8.5% unconditional and 2.5% conditional, a 11% reduction totally. Updated NDCs also includes a carbon sequestration capacity target for the forestry sector; 7% against BAU (2% unconditional and 5% conditional) through increasing of forest coverage. It is also worth to note the introduction of a new candidate for taking up GHG emission reduction challenge, the agriculture & Livestock sector. It is estimated through reduced post-harvest losses, increased crop productivity, and through introduction of renewable energy sources, the reduction will be 7% of BAU (4% unconditional and 3% conditional). Through the measures proposed in all sectors, overall GHG reduction target is 14.5% (4% unconditional and 10.5% conditional), an equivalent of 67,252 Gg of CO2.

    The recent NDCs updated by Sri Lanka and submitted to UNFCCC has a higher-level ambition compared to the fist submission. The enhanced ambition is observed in the following aspects.

    • Expanded sectoral targets such as including agriculture and livestock in mitigation actions.
    • Increased ambition in existing targets such as energy sector 
    • Further specification of targets including addition of time frames, quantified emissions reduction and other outcomes such as in the transport sector 
    • Increased transparency in the development of targets with detailed sub-targets.
    • Detail on the financing, monitoring and implementation of actions included in the NDC

    However, it is clear that level of local integration and mainstreaming aspects have shown a clear impact through the updated NDCs. The ownership of the NDC targets have been clearly taken by the sector lead organizations in the process. The government also announced that the new NDCs will be linked with a “NDC Implementation Plan” and a “NDC Financing Strategy”. Those will positively reinforce the NDCs and the transitioning process of the country. It is important to see how the pandemic related impacts on the economy and overall financing ambitions of the developed countries will impact on this. The decisions on the UNFCCC COP26 to be held in Glasgow will have a close impact on successful implementation of the NDCs. While accepting that the updated NDCs are a leap towards Sri Lanka’s net carbon zero targets, it is important to pay attention to few factors to be negated and receive positive influence from, in the implementation of NDCs. Policy cohesiveness, financing options, technology and capacity gaps, and implication of governments actions in other sectors, international pressure are some of the surfacing such complexities and externalities.

    Sri Lanka has made a steady progress in fulfilling the NDCs, while some recent policy changes drive the process yet there are some policies needs changes in order to fulfil the commitments while harnessing the economic, social and environmental benefits the CC context offers.

     

    Energy Recovery
    Bangladesh
    October 30, 2021 No Comments
    Introduction Global economies faced unprecedented chaos as COVID-19 pandemic spread throughout the world in the early months of 2020. Energy, particularly the use of electricity, is strongly related to the economic activity of any country. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, there have been short-term and long-term impacts on the power sector globally. For instance, the International Energy Agency reported that primary energy demand and global energy-related CO2 emissions reduced by 4% and 5.8%, respectively, in 2020; the CO2 emission reduction was 3.3% in the power sector in 2020. In the developing world, the impact of this pandemic has been devastating and has hindered the achievement of sustainable development goals by 2030. Goal-7 is one of the crucial sustainable development goals and is associated with “affordable and clean energy for all,” and developing countries’ energy sector impact assessment is an utmost priority for this pandemic situation. As for Bangladesh, well on its way to becoming a middle-income country by 2024, the outbreak of COVID-19 has wreaked havoc within the nation and caused major setbacks in its development pathways. Current Scenario of Power Sector in Bangladesh The electricity generation system in Bangladesh is dominated by fossil fuel generation. According to the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) and the Sustainable and Renewable Energy Development Authority (SREDA), fossil fuel and renewable generation capacities are at about 21,902 MW (including power import) and 766.8 MW (including Hydro), respectively (as of September 2021). The total electricity generation from fossil fuel in Bangladesh was 70,532 GWh (including power import) in the financial year 2019-20, of which the share of Natural gas was 72.7%, 13.6% from Liquid fuels (HSD & HFO) and 4.2% from coal. The country has been mainly dependent on domestic natural gas for energy. Over the five years, the share of natural gas in electricity generated from fossil fuel has ranged between 64% to 73%.
     2019-20  2018-19  2017-18  2016-17  2015-16
      Natural Gas   72.7% 69.2% 64.6% 67.6% 69.9%
      Liquid Fuels   13.6% 19.3% 24.9% 22.3% 21.0%
      Coal  4.2% 1.8% 2.7% 1.8% 1.7%
      Power Import  9.5% 9.7% 7.8% 8.3% 7.5%

    Bangladesh’s government started undertaking the reform initiatives to ensure necessary energy supplies for its users to support steady socio-economic development. To promote fuel diversification for power generation, while balancing production costs and electricity tariffs, the government of Bangladesh intends to lower its dependence on natural gas and explore other fuel sources. As the energy mix is set for a radical shift, the country’s current policies suggest that the energy demand will be met by a significant expansion of coal-based energy sources and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). Plans of replacing domestic gas with imported coal and LNG will have additional costs such as setting import terminals, storage, and regasification facilities. As such, this shift will ultimately lead to an increase in the overall cost of power generation in the long term and place an additional financial stress on government budgets as well as power consumers. While the unsustainability of fossil fuels has been discussed widely among the country’s energy experts, the reality of its risks has now been brought to the forefront by the recent pandemic. It is important that the country explores renewable energy sources more seriously, and it is doing so as well though not at the pace required.

    The prospect of renewable energy in Bangladesh is bright, particularly for solar due to the high solar radiation (4.0 to 6.5 kWh/m²/day). Bangladesh is recognized as one of the first countries in the world to implement Solar Home Systems (SHSs) in reaching consumers outside the national grid (Off-grid) or in places where the grid connection is delayed. And throughout the years, the installed capacity of Solar energy has been increased.

    *Figures are in MW unit

    Achievement in Renewable Energy Sector of Bangladesh in the last five years:

    • Installation of 730 MW capacity power plants/systems from Renewable Energy);
    • Installation of 6 million Solar Home System (SHS);
    • Replacement of 2225 diesel driven pumps by solar irrigation pumps;
    • Implementation of 27 solar mini grid projects;
    • Distribution of 10,000 solar systems among the poor people of Chattagram hill tracts and taking projects to bring about 42,000 another poor people under electrification;
    • Establishing central database system to renewable energy information;
    • Processing 1665.413 MW solar power plant; 
    • Signing of 200 MW wind power station
    • Completion of wind mapping in 13 places;
    • Kick off the establishing 1 MW waste to electricity station in at Keraniganj municipality in Dhaka;
    • Formulation of “Net Metering Guideline” and installation of 24 MW grid tied solar system under this guideline.

    Impact of COVID-19 on Bangladesh’s Power Sector

    When COVID-19 started to spread in Bangladesh, the country’s economic growth momentum suddenly faced a downturn. The pandemic consequently caused significant reductions in power demand and revenue. The country’s excessive capacity is also a key contributor to the financial losses suffered. COVID-19 has widened the gap between the power demand and the power generation capacity of the existing power plants. To make matters worse, Bangladesh also has numerous coal-fired plant projects in the pipeline. This combined with plans of additional LNG based power, will leave Bangladesh with the power capacity to generate at least fifty-eight percent more power than needed in 2029-30.

    To observe the Covid-19 pandemic effect on Bangladesh’s energy sector, the electricity demand from 2019 and 2020 is shown in the below figure. The electricity demand in March 2020 is found to be higher than in 2019. However, it started declining sharply from April 2020 till June 2020, it is still lower than the 2019 level. This is due to the fact that Bangladesh declared a nationwide general holiday on March 24. However, electricity demand is catching up at a high rate because of the relaxation of general holiday measures in the subsequent period, and in June 2020, it is just below the 2019 level.

    Sustainable Renewable Energy: A Way towards COVID Recovery

    Compared to fossil fuels, renewable investments are more stable, environmentally friendly, and increasingly cost-effective. Despite the sometimes-high initial costs of infrastructure setup, they offer consistent and predictable returns while delivering greater benefits to the wider economy, society, and environment. Bangladesh’s potential for availing renewable energy options, which has been considered limited due to issues of cost and land availability, is now far more viable than previously anticipated.

    As Bangladesh focuses on the long-term gains from availing more flexible renewable energy options, it is important to invest in solutions that overcome some of the existing RE barriers in the country and explore more economically viable opportunities.

    Due to the adverse impact on the environment for utilizing fossil fuels, many developed and developing countries are now inclined toward various forms of renewable energy like solar power, wind power, bioenergy, hydropower, etc. More renewable generation options for the electricity generation system in Bangladesh need to be explored. Due to the scarcity of land, it is difficult to achieve a substantial effect through solar generation in the country. There are also other options that require further research, which could be used as potential renewable sources to generate electricity, such as waste to energy schemes. 

    Cross-border electricity trading might be another option to reduce demand in a fossil fuel-dominated electricity generation system, along with the security of supply. For instance, Bhutan, Nepal, and India have a total estimated capacity of 263 GW hydropower potential. If these renewable energy potentials can be utilized through cross-border energy trading, a large amount of GHGs from the electricity sectors of Bangladesh could be saved. 

    As Bangladesh is a least developed country, research in the energy management and sustainability field is limited due to many constraints, such as inadequate funding. Thus, a lot of research needs to be conducted to identify potential solutions that could help reduce emissions from the electricity sector. One such area could be waste-to-green hydrogen generation and its application in the electricity generation sector.

    Energy Transition in Pakistan
    Pakistan
    October 1, 2021 No Comments

    The energy sector is the most critical driver of the global economy engine that supplies power to all sectors. Ensuring access to clean, affordable, and reliable energy for all, is a pre-requisite for progress on many SDGs linked with health, education, environment, and sustainable cities. Based on both economic and environmental trends, a major energy transition phase has been observed in which many countries have tried to opt for most sustainable energy future. While the trend is largely advocated by moving away from fossil fuel and adoption of renewable energy resources, there are still some questions over the scale and timeline of such a transition, especially considering the fact that the world is now facing a major threat due to restriction posed by a global pandemic, i.e., Covid-19.

    The energy sector of Pakistan, known for its slow pace of change, is undergoing a dynamic transition. The imperatives of climate change, energy poverty and energy security to underpin development and industrial strategy have made the widespread adoption of renewables and related technologies an essential solution. Policy drivers, technology developments and international co-operation have moved these technologies from niche to mainstream, especially in the past decade.

    Major changes in the energy sector took place after the power policy, 2015. The installed power generation capacity of Pakistan until august 2021 has reached 34,296 megawatts (MW), dominated by the RLNG/Gas/Oil based power plants (45%), followed by large hydro power plants(29%). Before 2017, only 31 megawatt coal power plant was operational, since March 2017, new coal power plants have been added with cumulative installed capacity of 4,520 megawatts (13% share of installed generation capacity of national grid). Renewable energy sector is dominated by, wind power followed by solar PV plants. Large scale new additions in wind and solar have not been witnessed since last year, on contrary distributed solar systems have got great traction and over 30 megawatts net metering licenses have been issued since the pandemic. Until date, renewable share stands at 12% of total installed power generation capacity (including nuclear and small hydro less than 25 MW).
    Based on the trend and new policies, investments as well as the interest in renewables in Pakistan has slightly increased in the past. In 2018, the total non-hydro renewable share in total generation was only 4 percent, which is slowly expected to increase. As pointed out in IRENA renewable energy readiness for Pakistan, there is a considerable wind potential in the corridors of Baluchistan and Sindh. The potential of solar is even more than that of wind. A 400 MW project of Quaid-e-Azam solar plant is under way with expansions planned. Other than that, an additional 550 MW of solar projects are under completion in the country. As of biomass, bagasse is currently the only source that is being used at a commercial scale in sugar industries, bagasse plants of around 432 MW are operational in the country.

    Despite being currently able to generate electricity in a surplus, major inefficiencies, losses, and theft in the distribution system has made the system very fragile. In recent years, Pakistan has observed some of the worst power blackouts due to poor transmission systems, lack of connectivity and poor reliability. Unlike most developed countries, Pakistan has a very limited fiscal space available and the policies are generally driven by economic priorities. The circular debt of Pakistan has now risen above PKR 2.35 trillion and is being contributed by surplus capacity payments. Consequently, between 2007 and 2020, the power crisis has cost Pakistan approximately $82 billion in loss GDP (Gross Domestic Product).

    The power sector suffers from institutional and structural disconnections and fragmentation in the priority of issues, ignoring the holistic view and focus only on the power sector. For instance, the development of coal power plants has observed a two-dimensional debate among various stakeholders in Pakistan where some admire its critical role to enhance energy security and economic advantages while others advocate the adverse environmental impacts of these coal power plants. The government’s objective is to reduce the reliance on fossil fuels imports, increase renewable energy share, diversify the fuel resources, and increase fuel supply security. The planned massive capacity additions on coal-fired power generation projects contradict with all these objectives.

    Along with these multifaceted energy crises, the country is ranked among the top ten most affected and the most vulnerable countries to climate change from 2000 to 2019, according to the latest ‘Long Term Climate Risk Index’ report. Historically, an overall share of Pakistan in global carbon emissions (CO2) has remained less than one percent. The energy sector is the main contributor to GHG emissions. Pakistan intends to reduce its expected GHG emissions by up to 20 percent of (equivalent to 1603 MtCO2) by 2030, which amounts to US$ 40B at 2016 prices The climate adaptation costs are projected to be US$ 7–14B/annum, while mitigation costs for Pakistan are ranging between US$ 8 – 17B by 2050 (GoP and UNFCC 2011)

    Support Policies & Incentives
    The Alternate and Renewable Energy (ARE) policy 2019 is the recent policy, formulated to create a conducive environment for renewable energy growth in the power sector. The policy envisages having 20 percent of the total generation capacity from renewable energy technologies by 2025 and 30 percent by 2030. Further, the policy also aims to increasing the share of hydro power in the power generation mix to 30 percent by 2030. So, as per the plans, Pakistan will be able to generate around 60 percent of its total energy from renewables. Moreover, the policy aims to lower the average price basket of tariff by allowing a competitive bidding for new projects whereas all taxes and duties are waived for the import of machinery required for renewable energy projects.

    National Electricity Policy 2020, was formulated to eliminate the inconsistencies in the power sector. The policy aims to bring an optimal development of electricity generation, transmission, and distribution while ending expensive power plants running on imported fuels. The six guiding principles of this policy include, bringing efficiency, competition, economic viability, transparency, and most importantly the environmental stability.

    Competitive Trading Bilateral Contract Market (CTBCM) Model by NEPRA was approved in 2020. This model aims transition from a one-buyer electricity market to a multi-buyer model. A multi-buyer model will assist the government to transition towards a competitive market for increasing operation efficiency and decreasing the price of electricity to the consumers.

    National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) announced distributed generation and net metering regulations on September 1, 2015. As per these regulations, any customer of the national grid (having three-phase connection) can avail net-metering facility for small-scale (1kW to 1MW) Renewable Energy installations. The power distribution companies (DISCOs) in Pakistan are directed to purchase excess units of electricity produced by the consumers, and net them off against the units consumed from the grid. Recently the cabinet has approved that consumers having RE installations would not require generation license from NEPRA for net metering, the distribution companies can directly provide net metering licenses and connections. NEPRA has asked the DISCOs to formulate the SOPs for the new net metering connections under 25KW of RE installations.

    Financial incentives have played an important role in adoption of renewable technologies in Pakistan, both grid connected and off grid systems. Green financing scheme is offered by State Bank of Pakistan at 6% to consumers for 1KW up to 10Megawatt renewable energy systems.

    Challenges
    Data unavailability for wind and solar PV power projects is the biggest challenge faced by the investors or financing institutions. However, limited feasibility studies have been carried out for project implementations. Around 40+ wind masts are installed in Pakistan for data generation. Although the World Bank studies have identified the 18 theoretical as well as technical potential sites for solar and wind, but the ground realities quickly change with the passage of time and externalities. Another reason behind the impeding growth of renewables is the absence of developed power transmission infrastructure to dispatch the generation from renewable power plants resulting in curtailment issues.

    Way Forward
    The way forward for Pakistan will demand rapid transition towards decarbonization, decentralization and digitalization of energy production, supply and consumption. This must include:

    • prioritized actions for renewables, such as least-cost generation plan, RE trackers and zoning, developing mini and micro grids
    • technology transfer programs and skill development through soliciting investments in local RE equipment to reduce the costs
    • efficient buildings and green infrastructures for responsible investments,
    • clean cooking solutions
    • regional cooperation to be able to meet the national and international targets of Pakistan
    • creating jobs and employment

    Lack of planning and policy mismatch between different departments requires a structured stakeholder involvement and the provinces must come up with power planning development studies for evidence-based policymaking and overcoming the barriers of renewable energy growth in the country. An integrated energy plan considering investments in generation, transmission and distribution, and energy efficiency should set up priorities for technology and scale of renewable energy projects. This would help to ensure a more sound and effective competitive bidding for these projects. It would assist policy makers at all levels to evaluate costs of both demand and supply under a given set of economical, technological, and environmental constraints.

    Sustainably transitioning
    Uncategorized
    September 15, 2021 No Comments

    Sustainably transitioning to renewable energy is vitally important for the Maldives survival, with the impacts of COVID-19 and climate change further exacerbating and accelerating the dire need to complete this clean energy transition.

    The Maldives is a small island nation of approximately 450,000 people in the Indian Ocean. It is on the frontline of the climate crisis, as 80% of Maldivian islands are less than 1 meter (3 feet) above sea level and consist of porous coral. The country is projected to be underwater due to sea level rise in 50 years unless drastic action is taken immediately[1]. The Maldives is facing a slew of climate change impacts including coastal erosion, flooding and water table salinisation leading to food and water insecurity, threats to human health, settlements, critical infrastructure, livelihoods and economic security. The COVID-19 pandemic has further compounded the climate change impacts besieging the nation.

    The pandemic has ravaged the country, not only due to COVID deaths, infections, and overtaxing limited healthcare resources, but by eliminating the economic means to address both the pandemic and climate change. Tourism accounts for approximately ⅓ of GDP, while fisheries comprise another ⅓. Border closures, quarantines, and the halting of imports and exports completely shut down ⅔ of the Maldives economy, crippling livelihoods nation-wide.

    “Twenty-eight percent of our GDP is directly related to the tourism industry. Sixty percent of our foreign exchange receipts come from tourism. The pandemic really stopped the source of income for over 30,000 people who are directly employed in the tourism sector and many others who indirectly benefit from the tourism industry. Fishing is the second largest economic activity, and during the pandemic, we had no way of exporting. We really had no money. At the same time, we had to spend so much on health care,” explained Aminath Shauna, the Environment, Climate Change and Technology Minister[2].

    Additionally, with fuel imports halted, electricity and transportation were crippled.

    The Maldives has long garnered international attention for its innovative and strategic activism against climate change, including a holistic approach to sustainable development that aims for carbon neutrality. While a complete transition to renewable energy is underway, reliance on oil and gas remains a necessity for survival. Seeking healthcare requires boat and/or plane transportation between remote islands; the pandemic made this situation more dire due to limited fuel resources. Water security has also become calamitous, as desalination plants that run on fuel are vital to provide fresh water – especially as climate change rapidly salinates water tables.

    The interrelated threats posed by the pandemic and climate change, have highlighted the survival necessity of transitioning to an environmentally sustainable, renewable energy infrastructure. A variety of national legislation and policies have been implemented to enable the renewable energy transition. “Maldives may be small, but we are committed to do our part. Which is why we are focussing on decarbonising our economy and reducing our reliance on fossil fuels starting with our energy sector,” noted Minister Aminath Shauna[3].

    Recently, the Majjlis, the Maldives’ parliament, passed the Climate Emergency Act, ratified by President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih in May 2021, which includes allocating funds for renewable energy sources[4]. The Energy Act, ratified September 2021, goes even further by “establishing a legal framework of standards and laws for the provision of energy…that are sustainable and safe for the environment…” that will promote renewable energy technology[5].

    Although renewable energy, sustainable development and carbon neutrality have long been national priorities, reflected in policy and legislation, past political instability – following the 2008 democratic transition – has thwarted green energy transition progress[6]. Additionally, the promise of 100 billion dollars annually by developed nations world-wide to address the climate crisis has not been delivered, greatly harming developing nations, such as the Maldives, in reaching their carbon neutral and renewable energy transition goals[7].

    As the catastrophic COVID-19 pandemic and climate crisis impacts have demonstrated, the Maldives must complete its transition to renewable energy immediately, with the promised support of developed nations, to ensure not just the well-being, but the survival of its citizens.

    [1] https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/

    [2] https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2021/09/maldives-climate-change-aminath-shauna-trenches.htm

    [3] https://www.environment.gov.mv/v2/en/news/12294

    [4] https://presidency.gov.mv/Press/Article/24678

    [5] https://presidency.gov.mv/Press/Article/25429
    https://majlis.gov.mv/en/19-parliament/parliament-work/432

    [6] https://minivannewsarchive.com/politics/participants-identify-political-instability-as-key-concern-at-maldives-renewable-energy-investment-conference-59697/comment-page-1

    [7] https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/100_billion_climate_finance_report.pdf

    Electric Mobility in Nepal
    Nepal
    September 15, 2021 No Comments

    Electric mobility is not new to Nepal. In fact, it began in 1975, when an electric trolley bus system was set up in Kathmandu with Chinese assistance. The 13 km trolley bus line, owned and operated by a government corporation, operated from 1979 till 2009, when it permanently shut down because of political and bureaucratic mismanagement[1]. The next major milestone was in 1995. That year, the 12-seater battery powered electrical three-wheelers were introduced on the streets of Kathmandu to replace the highly polluting diesel operated three-wheelers – the “Vikram tempos”. These electric three-wheelers, called “Safa Tempos”, or clean three-wheelers, are locally manufactured. At one point in early 2000, they constituted the largest fleet of battery-powered public transport vehicles in the world[2]. Currently, about 700 safa tempos are still in operation[3]. In addition to ferrying passengers, they are also used for freight and solid waste transport. In addition, the number of suppliers and private users of two-wheeler and four-wheeler electric vehicles is steadily increasing. Of about 15,000 automobiles sold annually in Nepal, about 1,200 are electric[4]. There have also been numerous experimental attempts at converting internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles to electricity. There is also a transport company, Sundar Yatayat, currently operating 4 public electric buses in Kathmandu[5].

    Nepal also has policy strategies for promoting electric vehicles. The National Climate Change Policy of 2019[6] prioritizes switching to electricity for various industries and infrastructure including transportation. The National Transport Policy of 2014, the Environment and the Climate Policies of 2019[7] encourage and promote the use of electric vehicles. The Environment-Friendly Vehicle and Transport Policy of 2014 had set a target of 20% of total vehicle fleet to be “environmentally friendly”. Unfortunately, this target has not been met. This Policy had also set targets for establishing charging stations. The 2018 National Action Plan for Electric Mobility proposes various initiatives to promote electric mobility in Nepal. However, it does not have timelines nor an investment plan. Nepal’s Nationally Determined Contribution of 2020 has a target of 90% of private and 60% of public vehicle sales to be electric by 2030.

    The government is ,however, trying to meet its goals through a few policy instruments in place. In 2016, the government reduced electric vehicle (EV) customs duty to 1% for public transport and 10% for private vehicles (both from  30%. It is 80% for ICE vehicles). Furthermore, EV are exempt from excise duty (55-1oo% for ICE vehicles) and pay only 4% road tax (compared to 8-10% for other vehicles). However, in 2020 the government regressively increased the customs duty for private EVs to 40% and levied excise duty ranging from 30-80% depending on the power of the EVs. It also increased the road tax to 5%. Another policy instrument in place is reduced tariff for EV charging stations.

    Promoting EVs in Nepal has several benefits. Firstly, Nepal is already beginning to experience electricity surplus, especially during the off-peak hours during the day and night. With suitable electricity pricing, the surplus electricity can be used for charging of EVs. Secondly, petroleum products constitute about 15% of Nepal’s import bill, which is a big drain on Nepal’s foreign currency reserve. Substituting vehicle fuel from petroleum with electricity will reduce this drastically. Thirdly, vehicular emissions contribute significantly to ambient air pollution, especially in cities like Kathmandu. EVs will help to reduce this pollution drastically too. Fourthly, calculations have shown that the life cycle cost of owning and operating an electric vehicle is lower than that for an ICE vehicle. Consequently, there is a growing interest to both purchase EVs and to set up EV based businesses.

    However, more needs to be done to meet the national aspirations for electric mobility so that we can realize its benefits. Some of the future steps that need to be taken include the government formulating an integrated and realistic policy strategy that includes specific targets and timelines. The strategy will then need to be operationalized through appropriate policy instruments policies. Since the upfront cost of EVs are generally higher than that for ICE vehicles, there will also be a need for financial institutions to formulate and implement innovative financing instruments. Innovative business models regarding sale of EVs and installation and operation of charging stations will help promote EVs. In the new federal structure of governance in Nepal, partnership between local governments & the private sector to promote public electric mobility will also be important. Finally, Nepal will have to aggressively implement it newly formulated National Distribution Plan to augment the existing electricity distribution system, such that households, businesses and charging stations can be assured of adequate and reliable electricity supply.

    [1] https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/kathmandu-bhaktapur-trolley-bus/

    [2] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-26/why-nepal-once-led-the-world-in-electric-buses

    [3] http://www.mofe.gov.np/downloadfile/E-mobility%20Assmnt%20NDC%202020_1623998131.pdf

    [4] https://kathmandupost.com/national/2021/06/21/nepal-to-switch-to-light-electric-vehicles-by-2031-as-fossil-fuel-import-balloons

    [5] http://www.newbusinessage.com/Articles/view/13253

    [6] https://www.mofe.gov.np/downloadsdetail/8/2018/36366627/

    [7] ibid

    Sri Lanka sets Renewable Energy
    Sri Lanka
    September 1, 2021 No Comments

    In a recent press release by the presidential secretariate, Sri Lankan President Gotabaya directed the authorities that Sri Lanka should devise a plan to meet 70% of the country’s electricity demand to be met by renewable sources by 2030[1]. This is a drastic increase in the ambition level, and it has even exceeded the energy sector targets of the recently updated NDC of Sri Lanka. Along with the 2030 RE targets, there were statements issued by the government that Sri Lanka is aiming to achieve net-zero status by 2050.

    Many factors will determine how soon the transition to 100% RE will happen , yet one of the most influential facts is the political will. In July 2021, the government of Sri Lanka officially submitted its updated NDC ahead of the 26th Conference of Parties (COP26) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCCC). According to this Sri Lanka envisioned to reduce the greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions from the energy sector by 25% against the Business-As-Usual (BAU) trajectories (5% unconditionally and 20% conditionally). It is a 5% enhanced target for the energy sector against the first NDCs submitted by Sri Lanka in 2016. In less than 2 months of submitting the updated NDCs, the new policy level target of 70% renewable energy by 2030 has been announced by Sri Lanka which is a significantly high-ambition target for a small developing country.

    In the recent past, renewable energy has become one of the most discussed and debated topics within the policymaking circles as well as among the political circles. The signs of moving towards a higher RE mix in the energy sector was apparent since 2006. The then government’s policy proposed to achieve a 38% RE mix target for electricity, comprising of10% non-conventional renewable energy (NCRE); small hydro, wind, solar and biomass sources and 28% large hydro ; conventional renewable energy by 2015[2]. The national energy policy has been introduced in 2008[3] formulated under leadership of the then President. By end of 2015, Sri Lanka exceeded the target by achieving 11% NCRE (including small hydro) generation and 37.5% from conventional hydro generation, making them total share of renewable energy as 48.7% of the total energy generation[4]. However, the first coal power plant was also commissioned during this period by the monopolistic utility of Sri Lanka, the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB). There were discussions on drawbacks in the renewable energy governance, which led to a major disagreement between the key agencies; Sri Lanka Sustainable Development Authority (SLSEA), Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka (PUCSL) and Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB), on the feed-in tariffs for solar and wind. During this period provisional approvals were not issued for new wind and solar development since 2012[5].

    Next policy milestone; “Sri Lanka energy sector development plan 2015-2025”[6], was formulated under, “general policy guidelines 2019”[7], which directed optimization of the share of renewable energy, under the new government formed in 2015. A policy level target was set to increase the share of renewable energy-based electricity generation from 50% that of the 2015 to 60% by 2020 and 100% by 2030. This target was not reflected in the Long Term Generation and Expansion Plan (LTGEP) of CEB (utility) as well as in the first NDC (2016) of Sri Lanka. However, the NDC targets included a target of adding over 900 MW of installed RE capacity in the country[8]. By end of 2020, after adding 161 MW RE capacity, the total RE generation in Sri Lanka settled at 36% total electricity generation of which the non-conventional renewable energy share was only 12% (including small hydro and rooftop solar)[9].

    Both the presidential and general election manifestoes of the current government, which came to the power in 2019, has not given any targets of RE but a general policy on promoting RE. However, the new government has to face the emergence of the covid19 pandemic which exerted tremendous pressure on the country’s economy. The loss of revenue from tourism and major export sectors forced the government to bring in control on imports, especially the non-essential items. This was later seen gradually encroaching beyond the non-essential imports including fertilizer and agrochemicals. With the dwindling foreign reserves, the government also faced the challenge of spending on imports of fuels and coal. Being a country that imports 100% of its fossil fuel requirements, the exchange drain for non-renewables has an amplified impact on the trade balance. It is potentially a very high push factor for the government to move away from fossils and enhance its RE share in their path of post-pandemic recovery.

    On the contrary to the progressive policy measures in setting RE targets, CEB’s Long Term Generation and Expansion Plan (LTGEP) 2025-2039, has predicted only 35% from renewable energy by 2039, which shows the level of ambition of the current policy target. There were some initial (and still are) speculations from the utility (the CEB) and the professionals attached to the CEB on the pragmatism of this high ambition target. The Vice President of PUSL, Prof Janaka Ekanayake have stated that lack of research infrastructure that will feed into a national policy, high investment cost and its short-term implications on the consumer, and negative perceptions of engineers responsible for, may stand on the way of Sri Lanka’s transition efforts[10]. However, now the CEB is revising its long-term generation and expansion plans to harmonize with the policy target of 70% RE by 2030.

    Given this continuous commitment by leadership, while appreciating the progress so far, it is worth understanding what other factors are there that may slow down Sri Lanka’s progress from reaching this target.

    Eng (Dr.) Vidhura Ralapanawe, an activist and a professional advocating for 100% RE, has lashed at the CEB engineer’s position, identify himself with the vision of being 70 % renewable and the carbon zero within the proposed time frames. In a context where shifting to renewable/net-zero electricity has become a global phenomenon, renewable energy is proven to be the cheapest generating option and expected to reduce further, technological developments are sufficient to handle the technological phobias that kept us in the darkness, global businesses had already started responding to Paris Agreement of 55% reduction GHG emission by 2030 and carbon neutral by 2050, and global trading has already begun internalizing carbon costs which will have major implications Sri Lankan exports, Ralapanawe questions the backwardness of the long-term generation plan[11].

    In any case, now the policy decision of 70% RE by 2030 and net-zero by 2050 targets have been taken by Sri Lanka. The long-awaited political will is now in place for the renewable energy transition of the country and the energy plans are now being synchronized with the policy targets. This is a positive and progressive momentum as far as climate change and environmental perspectives are concerned. It is a challenging target, especially after a few horrendous waves of a global pandemic which placed the country on a very rough path of recovery. What is important at this stage is support and encouragement to achieve its ambitious energy transition targets.

    [1] https://www.presidentsoffice.gov.lk/index.php/2020/09/14/70-of-electricity-demand-will-be-generated-using-renewable-energy-by-2030/

    [2] https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/ncsa-documents/MahindaChintanaTenYearDevelopmentPlan.pdf, p69

    [3] The Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, No. 1553/10 – TUESDAY, JUNE 10, 2008 section 4.2 https://policy.asiapacificenergy.org/sites/default/files/National%20Energy%20Policy%20and%20Strategies%20of%20Sri%20Lanka.pdf

    [4] Statistical Digest CEB, 2016, https://ceb.lk/front_img/img_reports/1531991854CEB_Statistical_Digest_Report_2016.pdf

    [5] ADB, Sri Lanka Energy Sector Assessment, Strategy, And Road Map, 2019 https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/547381/sri-lanka-energy-assessment-strategy-road-map.pdf, p 53

    [6] CEB Long Term Generation and Expansion Plan 2020-2039, https://ceb.lk/front_img/img_reports/1591174971Revised_LTGEP_2020-2039.pdf

    [7] The Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, No. 2135/61 – FRIDAY, AUGUST 09, 2019, http://www.energy.gov.lk/images/resources/downloads/national-energy-policy-2019-en.pdf

    [8] NDC, 2016, https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Sri%20Lanka%20First/NDCs%20of%20Sri%20Lanka.pdf

    [9] Statistical Digest CEB, 2020, https://ceb.lk/front_img/img_reports/1626946210CEB-Statistical_Digest-Form-2020-Web_Version.pdf

    [10] Aruna (Sinhala News Paper), https://epaper.aruna.lk/Home/ArticleView?eid=1&edate=10/10/2021&pgid=58345 September 26, 2021, p5

    [11] Eng. (Dr). Vidhura Ralapanwa, TOWARDS 70% RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY AND MORE BY 2030, The Official E-Newsletter of the Institution of Engineers Sri Lanka, Issue 58 – September 2021, https://iesl.lk/SLEN/58/Renewable_Electricity.php?fbclid=IwAR3nPYCTicK0NQIifT_h9ucOF_Q6M9skSv56uS03Fyab8HC__WSj7SLnKG0

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